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Abstract  
A Regional System Operator in the Western Interconnection would create significant 
environmental and economic benefits. California alone could realize annual savings of up 
to 1.5 billion dollars while cutting the state’s greenhouse gas emissions by eight to ten 
percent in 2030. However, many stakeholders have rejected development of a Regional 
System Operator both historically and in recent California Legislative sessions. Ultimately, 
key stakeholders’ fears of repeating the California Electricity Crisis, relinquishing state 
authority, allowing greater interference from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
and sacrificing legislative environmental progress in California have created political 
opposition and legislative failures blocking efforts to develop a Regional System Operator. 
To overcome these political failures and realize the benefits of a better-organized regional 
electricity market, stakeholders will need to compromise and accept the vague risks of 
unforeseen consequences.  
Introduction  
As the world’s sixth largest economy and a major leader in environmental regulation, 
California must find economically efficient solutions to meet its substantial clean energy 
goals. In 2015, Senate Bill 350 mandated that the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) be set at 50 percent by 2030, thus requiring 50 percent of the state’s electricity 
generation to be procured from renewable sources. In accordance with an Executive Order 
signed in 2005, by 2050 the state must also reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 
80 percent below 1990 levels. State policymakers recognize that to reach such lofty goals 
in the next three decades, dramatic changes in California’s energy sector will likely be 
necessary. Transforming California’s current energy system has become a major legislative 
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focus. In the pursuit of reducing GHG emissions in the electricity sector, the state has 
encouraged distributed electricity generation, customer demand response programs, solar 
and wind electricity generation, and utility and residential scale electricity storage, in 
addition to other programs. The state has also considered the creation of a Regional System 
Operator (RSO) as an avenue to significantly reduce GHG emissions while decreasing 
electricity costs by facilitating greater integration of electricity generation over a broader 
region. 
The California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO’s) creation of a regional, 
real-time market—the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM)—has been particularly successful 
in enabling California to integrate more renewable generation into its electricity supplies 
and thereby reduce GHG emissions. Created in 2014 with just two participants, the EIM 
has already reduced GHG emissions by over 3.4 million metric tons per quarter and 
produced more than 213.34 million dollars in total benefits by enabling participating 
balancing authorities (BAs) to collaboratively and more efficiently meet last-minute supply 
and demand inequalities in a five-minute-ahead market (Trabish “Taming the Wild West”; 
Zichella “Energy Imbalance Market”). Though only five of the 38 functional BAs in the 
Western Interconnection currently participate in the EIM, seven more BAs have announced 
plans to join the market in the next three years (Trabish “Taming the Wild West”). 
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Figure 1: The Energy Imbalance Market 
 
Although it covers only five percent of market transactions, the EIM has provided 
enormous benefits to its participants since its inception (Trabish “Taming the Wild West”). 
The other 95 percent of market transactions occur independently in each BA’s day-ahead 
market. Broad regional Independent System Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) handle the majority of these day-ahead market transactions in the 
Eastern Interconnection.1 Beyond the CAISO in California, the Western Interconnection 
                                                
1 While there are technical nuances that differentiate ISOs and RTOs, they essentially 
provide the same kind of organized markets. 
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lacks structured regional day-ahead markets to facilitate short-term, efficiency-enhancing 
transactions. In addition to a day-ahead market, the CAISO also operates fifteen-minute 
scheduling and five-minute dispatch intervals within its limited footprint, while other 
Western BAs “are less operationally flexible” and primarily balance loads “through 
standard one-hour schedules with transfers held constant over the time period” (Lenhart et 
al. 98). Though this relatively coarse market structure has functioned reasonably well 
historically, the challenge of integrating substantially more intermittent renewable 
electricity requires greater flexibility, granularity, and improved grid visibility. 
The Western U.S. contains one enormous, synchronous grid known as the Western 
Interconnection in which 38 BAs, managed by the federal regulated Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council (WECC), cooperate to ensure grid reliability. Grids are operated with 
the goal of maintaining electrical reliability to prevent blackouts and other malfunctions 
that can cause economic damage to customers by interrupting their activities and can 
physically damage grid infrastructure. To assure constant reliability, BAs (sometimes 
called “control area operators”) must ensure that local electricity injections constantly 
match local withdrawals, while also enabling scheduled interchanges across BA 
boundaries as requested by wholesale buyers and sellers of power. Wholesale commerce 
in electricity is important because it enables Load Serving Entities to control their power 
supply costs.2 Electricity commerce takes place among entities across the grid by 
increasing injections in one region while increasing withdrawal at another location on a 
precisely coordinated basis to ensure that the entire grid remains balanced. Electricity 
commerce was once dominated by bilateral contracts, in which a specific buyer and 
                                                
2 Load serving entities provide electricity to wholesale customers and end-users 
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specific seller enter into a contract with one another to exchange electricity or generation 
capacity for a specified period of time.3 This commerce might require exchanges of 
electricity across one or more BAs before reaching the final destination, so there must be 
participation, cooperation, and close coordination by multiple BAs to achieve these 
commercial objectives while also maintaining grid reliability. Though actual electricity 
loads can vary greatly, bilateral contracts usually set fixed amounts of electricity in advance 
(something called a “block-loaded” transaction), creating inefficiencies when the 
contracted amount does not precisely match the amount of electricity required by the buyer 
at the time the transaction is physically executed. Furthermore, electricity markets have 
evolved greatly and are no longer dominated by utilities as the usual wholesale buyers and 
sellers of electricity. There are now many participants in electricity commerce, which 
makes gathering sufficient information about the financial strength and creditworthiness of 
a potential contract partner more difficult.  
In contrast, many RTOs operate day-ahead markets utilizing a market 
clearinghouse model with anonymous buyers and sellers that serves to reduce transaction 
costs. This model allows for unique risk management. The clearinghouse model reduces 
financial risk incurred by the sellers by enabling participants to buy or sell electricity on an 
essentially anonymous basis without a unique seller being exposed to a unique buyer. 
Instead, the RTO simply operates centralized markets based on multiple bids from many 
buys and many sellers. The RTO then “clears the market” at a single price and informs the 
buyers that they are entitled to receive specific amounts of power and informs the sellers 
that they are obligated to provide specific amounts of power. The RTO later collects the 
                                                
3 Generation capacity is the standby ability to produce power  
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total amount of money owed by all buyers and disburses it to all of the respective providers 
of the power. By contrast, under a bilateral contract (which are also still permitted), it is 
incumbent upon the seller to understand the creditworthiness of a specific buyer, as it often 
takes a period of time for money to be transferred from the buyer to the seller and there is 
potential for defaults on payments. A clearinghouse market thus reduces transaction costs 
that may result from asymmetrical information, as the RTO administers general overall 
requirements for creditworthiness and any subsequent losses from default are spread over 
all participants. The system thus operates to create a mutual insurance feature among 
participants. 
The CAISO is a relatively new institution that arose out of California’s electricity 
restructuring in 1998 and operates a day-ahead and five-minute market in the state. The 
Federal Energy Policy Act of 1992 facilitated competition in wholesale electricity 
commerce by mandating that transmission owners provide access to their transmission 
systems on a non-discriminatory basis. The FERC immediately followed up by promoting 
RTO formation in Orders Nos. 888 and 889, and later Order No. 2000, as a way to 
encourage a more competitive wholesale marketplace, ensure nondiscriminatory 
transmission access, and reduce the inefficiencies resulting from fragmented electricity 
markets (FERC “Regional Transmission”). In 1996, California adopted Assembly Bill 
1890 requiring a restructuring of the state’s electricity markets to further facilitate 
wholesale competition and to also introduce retail competition—the ability of consumers 
to shop for their individual electricity providers. The bill ultimately led to greater 
“deregulation” and the creation of the CAISO in 1998, which in 2008 became a fully 
functioning ISO (FERC “Regional Transmission”; FERC “Electric Power Markets”). Due 
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to its intimate involvement in wholesale electricity commerce and bulk power system 
reliability, the CAISO is regulated by the FERC and acts as a BA and transmission grid 
operator (CAISO “Interconnection Basics” 3). The CAISO and other control area operators 
are often compared to air traffic controllers “because they independently manage the 
electron traffic on a power grid they don’t own” (CAISO “ISO History”). Like other RTOs, 
the CAISO facilitates idiosyncratic bilateral contracts in addition to highly structured, day-
ahead and real-time five-minute clearinghouse markets in which individual buyers are not 
matched with individual sellers.  
Outside of the CAISO and the EIM participants, the Western Interconnection 
currently lacks a unified organized market structure. The WECC oversees the coordination 
of grid reliability among the BAs, but it plays no material role in structuring wholesale 
electricity commerce. This responsibility is left to the BAs. In comparison, the Eastern 
Interconnection is home to several massive interstate RTOs and ISOs, like the 
Midcontinent ISO (MISO), Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland RTO (PJM), and the 
Southwest Power Pool RTO (SPP). The CAISO’s creation of an EIM in 2014 incrementally 
but significantly improved the region’s market structure by introducing a voluntary, real-
time five-minute market to meet last minute inequalities in supply and demand. Each 
additional participant in the EIM strengthens the market by contributing greater generation 
and transmission capabilities. The EIM has greatly facilitated the integration of more 
intermittent renewables, such as wind and solar. However, an RSO would likely 
significantly further increase the efficient penetration of renewables into the Western 
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Interconnection while providing large economic savings for participants. 
 
Figure 2: Existing North American RTOs  
 
Benefits of an RSO  
An RSO in the Western Interconnection would likely bring benefits in the form of greater 
grid stability, increased integration of renewables, efficiency from consolidated planning, 
and reduced transaction and investment charges. Implementing an RSO would save 
Californian consumers up to $1.5 billion per year while cutting the state’s emissions by 
eight to ten percent in 2030 and reducing total Western region emissions by three to four 
percent by the same year” (Trabish “The Head”) California would be able to reduce 
emissions by 55 to 60 percent from 1990 levels as soon as 2030 (Brint et al. 44). By 
choosing not to develop an RSO, stakeholders in the Western Interconnection are forgoing 
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lower transaction fees, better allocation of transmission project costs, and more 
comprehensive grid planning.  
Though the Western Interconnection is an electrically unified grid, the 38 BAs are 
operationally balkanized and act as “islands” that independently maintain sufficient 
generation capacity within their geographic region to serve customers if something 
unexpected happens and they become disconnected from surrounding BAs. This self-
sufficiency is less efficient than working under a unified grid to collaboratively meet 
demand, as the “smaller control areas have constrained access to the resources necessary 
to optimize reliability and system economics” (O’Boyle). 4 The introduction of an EIM has 
effectively addressed last-minute inequalities in energy supply and demand for 
participating BAs, but it is unable to impact the other 95 percent of transactions occurring 
in day-ahead markets. By forgoing collaborative resource adequacy and conducting most 
day-ahead transactions independently and predominantly through bilateral contracts, the 
Western Interconnection does not operate as efficiently as possible.  
                                                
4 While individual capacity reserves are generally lower under RTOs, BAs might face 
increased risk depending on their own risk averseness. BAs have the ability to decide 
how self-reliant they want to be through the level of their capacity reserves. Though an 
RTO can operate with a smaller margin due to its ability to diversify loads and resources 
across a bigger base, individual BA’s who are “reliability obsessed” might have to accept 
that they might be more likely to go completely dark because of the lower margin. 
Operators within a smaller existing control area who are entertaining whether they want 
to become part of a bigger control area must consider that they are likely giving up their 
authority over how self-reliant they want to be and potentially making their own part of 
the grid more likely to have blackouts if the bigger RSO slims down reserve margins on 
the assumption that they can reliably source generation across a larger footprint. 
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Figure 3: The 38 Balancing Authorities (BAs) of the Western Interconnection 
 
An RSO would create an organized market for day-ahead transactions that would 
dispatch least-cost generation from across the Western Interconnection by expanding the 
CAISO’s geographic footprint. The introduction of an RSO would lead to a decrease in 
individual energy generation, though participants would still be able to meet minimum 
reserve requirements at these lower levels of generation (CAISO “SB 350 Study”).5 For 
example, the “SPP decreased its reserve requirements from 18% to 13%, saving billions 
                                                
5 The overall amount of electricity in the grid is not changing, as it must always remain in 
balance. However, there is a significant amount of ‘no load’ work done to operate 
spinning reserves, which is excess electrical capacity maintained by constantly operating 
plants at low levels. With a wider geographic footprint, shared capacity reserves reduce 
the need for spinning reserves, which in turn reduces the amount of fuel being used for 
‘no load’ work. 
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without compromising reliability, because [its] operator can use pooled reserves” (Trabish 
“Transmission Developers”). California’s costs for the sale, generation, and purchase of 
wholesale power would also likely decrease. Assuming that an ISO has economies of scale, 
annual operating costs would be distributed across more states and thus decrease (CAISO 
“SB 350 Study”). Furthermore, an RSO would also create a more transparent marketplace 
and would do away with redundant transmission access charges as well as inefficient 
bilateral transmission contracts between BAs. Seam issues and resulting inefficiencies 
arise when two or more BAs have differing rules regarding transmission scheduling, 
market rules, and generation dispatch. With seams issues and reduced transaction costs no 
longer inhibiting otherwise profitable exchanges and, therefore, efficient incremental re-
dispatches of the grid, there would be greater efficiencies and savings in the market. The 
grid would become more stable with the incorporation of more flexible plants available to 
each participant, as well as with better real-time visibility of system conditions and 
improved regional power-flow management (CAISO “ISO Regional”). Furthermore, the 
grid would also benefit from a consolidated planning approach that would better identify 
necessary improvements and reliability needs while more efficiently utilizing existing 
resources and avoiding unnecessary transmission or capacity investments.   
The RSO’s large footprint would provide great environmental advantages due to 
participants’ increased ability to incorporate intermittent renewables into the grid. The 
majority of states in the Western Interconnection have established an RPS, and the entire 
grid will likely continue to see increased renewable energy production (Lew 1). Given that 
power production from some renewables -- especially wind and solar resources -- is 
intermittent and non-controllable, BAs are often forced to maintain high levels of flexible 
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ramping reserves to respond to rapid shifts in renewable energy production. Ramping 
reserves are resources continually operated at low levels with the ability to be increased 
quickly to instantly increase their injections into the grid if the wind suddenly dies down 
or a cloud comes over a solar facility. These plants must be operating, and thus generating 
more electricity, even when operators would rather meet demand with cheaper electricity 
from renewables. The RSO’s large geographic footprint would help mitigate the impacts 
of intermittency because increased generation capacity across the region would be capable 
of instantly compensating for reduced power injections from renewables. Rather than 
having to maintain enough individual resources to meet a BA’s load, participants in an 
RSO can instead work collaboratively to meet the region’s peak load and thus individually 
maintain lower peak generation capacity, resulting in savings for customers. Without action 
to unify the Western Interconnection, “RPS compliance and the integration of renewables 
into the CAISO grid will become more challenging and comparatively costlier as the levels 
of variable energy resources continues to grow” (Brint 23). Thus, states with large RPS 
goals, like California, stand to benefit greatly from the collaborative nature of an RSO. 
In addition to having larger aggregate energy supplies, the wider geographic scope 
of an RSO would better capture benefits from load diversity. Differing weather patterns 
across the region might mean that Oregon is having an extremely cloudy day without wind 
while Nevada has abundant solar production. An RSO would always dispatch least-cost 
resources first, which in this case would mean Nevada’s solar would help meet Oregon’s 
demand. In addition to weather-based variability, the RSO would include participants with 
summer-peaking and winter-peaking loads. Californians utilize more energy in their hot 
summers, while residents of Wyoming tend to use more electricity to keep warm in the 
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winter. Varying peaking seasons would, therefore, promote greater stability by lowering 
the combined capacity need in comparison to individual capacity needs. Participants would 
additionally benefit from the latitudinal scope of the RSO’s footprint. Californian demand 
for electricity starts rising at around 4:30 in the morning, before the state’s solar is 
generating. However, solar generation from states like New Mexico and Arizona is 
available and could be dispatched to California (Trabish “The Head”).   
With aggressive renewable energy goals, Californians especially stand to benefit 
from the formation of an RSO. At times, generators in the state already experience 
overgeneration: producing more renewable energy than can be economically integrated 
into the power system. On these days, generators may have to sell their energy at negative 
prices during some hours. In other words, they will have to actually pay some buyer to 
“purchase” their energy. Under more extreme system conditions, some renewable energy 
generation may have to be curtailed—that is, the generator is actually disconnected from 
the grid or turned off. Obviously, such curtailment will have negative effects on new 
renewable generation investment: “Resource curtailment affects the economics of wind 
and solar development and can stymie progress toward policy goals” (Lenhart et al. 
94).  The CAISO curtailed 80 Gigawatt hours of renewable power in March 2017 due to 
overgeneration. Under the right institutional circumstances, other Western states might 
have absorbed this cheap, clean electricity, enabling them to reduce generation from fossil-
fuels. A recent study found that in 2030, under a 50 percent RPS, Californian curtailment 
would stand around 4.8 percent (Nelson and Wisland 17). However, by adopting an RSO, 
as well as greater electricity storage and demand response programs, the state could 
decrease curtailment to .08 percent in 2030 (Brint 22). The RSO market structure is better 
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equipped to “fairly compensate and cost-effectively balance solar energy output” and can 
therefore incentivize new investment in solar while creating better returns for existing solar 
generation (Pfeifenberger 5). Utilities must still pay for renewables even during 
curtailment, so as the CAISO President and CEO Steve Berberich said, “It would be better 
for them to get something for them rather than nothing” (Trabish “The Head”). Reducing 
curtailment by dispatching overgeneration provides economic benefits for participants 
receiving cheap energy and utilities producing the energy, as well as environmental 
benefits by utilizing renewable energy rather than coal or gas-fired production. 
An RSO is one of the most cost-effective ways to avoid excessive overgeneration 
and reduce the cost of integrating renewable generation in California, which is becoming 
crucial for the state to meet its ambitious policy goals. Many experts believe that “it would 
be vastly more expensive” to reach the state’s clean energy goals without the introduction 
of an RSO (Baker). There is a growing discrepancy between the region’s peak solar energy 
production and residents’ peak demand for electricity. Experts have termed this growing 
difference between forecasted load and expected electricity production the “Duck Curve” 
- and they expect it to worsen in upcoming years without action (John). By mid-morning 
on sunny days during the early months of the year, as people head to work and reduce their 
personal energy consumption, the CAISO “must find room for an additional 8,000 to 
10,000 MW of largely photovoltaic-based generation - enough to supply roughly one-third 
of the ISO’s total demand from several million homes and businesses” (Staple). 
Furthermore, the Duck Curve worsens in the cooler winter season when less electricity is 
demanded to run air conditioning systems, creating large seasonal variance (John). To 
avoid the risk of overgeneration, the CAISO quickly reduces energy production from its 
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base load generators to the lowest possible level. When a BA’s generation is largely gas-
fired, however, plants must continue to operate at least at minimum levels during the mid-
day so that they can later ramp-up. This consistent generation further reduces the amount 
of renewable electricity the grid can receive throughout the day. Operators quickly ramp-
up during the late afternoon hours to meet rising demand from workers returning home as 
the sun sets, reducing the amount of renewable generation available. This steep ramp is 
costly, stresses the grid, and is projected to worsen as versatile gas-fired plants are retired 
to meet California’s RPS goals.6 However, this ramp could be mitigated through the 
establishment of an RSO under which the state could dispatch excess solar generation 
during the day and import energy in the evening to meet the ramp.  
 
Figure 4: The CAISO’s Duck Curve 
                                                
6 Handling the Duck Curve will be increasingly problematic as California retires gas 
plants because the state will likely lack generation that can quickly and reliably be 
ramped up or down. Without an acceptable replacement (like large batteries), the Duck 
Curve’s steep ramp may either inhibit the state from retiring gas plants or dramatically 
slow the retirement process. 
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A wider RSO may both serve to increase the usage of renewables and potentially 
decrease the amount of nonrenewable generation needed to serve total customer load 
within the RSO footprint. The RSO would dispatch lowest-cost generation first, which is 
generally renewable energy due to low or nonexistent fuel costs. With fewer flexible 
resources needed due to the large geographic footprint of the RSO, as well as the probable 
dominance of cheaper renewable resources, nonrenewable plants will likely operate less. 
An NRDC brief highlights that the less coal or gas plants operate, “the sooner they are 
likely to be retired as uneconomical” (Zichella “Regional Transmission” 3). Furthermore, 
the operating structure of RTO markets is more conducive to renewable energy integration. 
Costly barriers are reduced due to “improved regional transmission access and generation 
interconnection processes,” greater market and pricing transparency, “easier contracting 
for load-serving entities (including coops/munis) and commercial/industrial customers 
without their own transmission access to the region’s lowest-cost renewables” 
(Pfeifenberger 10). An RSO’s ability to support renewable energy will likely lead to greater 
renewable energy investment in the state, which will significantly aid California’s work to 
reach a 50 percent RPS by 2030. Furthermore, cheaper energy would support the state’s 
economic growth. 
While increased investment in energy storage and Californian renewables would 
create many short-term jobs as well as some long-term employment, the long-term effects 
of an RSO might be more significant. University of California, Berkeley, Professor of 
Economics David Roland-Holst believes that expenditure shifting from cheaper energy 
under the proposed RSO “is long term, creates more jobs, more kinds of jobs, and is more 
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likely to be for California goods and services” (Trabish “Taming the Wild West”). The 
average California household income would rise by about $300 to $550 annually by 2030 
from RSO-related savings (CAISO “ISO Regional”). Low-income households would also 
see proportionally greater economic benefits, as they spend more of their income on 
electricity consumption than the wealthy.  
Despite an RSO’s numerous environmental and economic benefits, many 
stakeholders remain staunchly opposed to its development. Ultimately, key stakeholders’ 
magnified fears of repeating the Enron Scandal, relinquishing authority, allowing greater 
FERC interference, and sacrificing legislative environmental progress in California 
resulted in political failure that prevented legislators from garnering sufficient support to 
pass the necessary legislation in the 2017 legislative session. Though these fears constitute 
large roadblocks in the development of an RSO, they are not insurmountable. Successful 
RTOs already exist within the nation and the CAISO has demonstrated its willingness to 
compromise and work with stakeholders. However, this has not been enough to sway key 
stakeholders to support legislation that would have likely reduced GHG emissions and 
reduced economic inefficiencies in the Western Interconnection. 
Barriers to an RSO: Lingering Californian Electricity Crisis Fears  
The California Electricity Crisis left the majority of politicians fearful of the complex and 
arcane issue of electricity market deregulation. Much of the Eastern Interconnection 
adopted RTOs in the late 1990s, but the Western Interconnection did not undergo a similar 
transformation and many politicians in the region now remain wary of such a change. In 
1999, a proposal to expand the western grid was introduced while the same movement was 
gaining traction in the Eastern Interconnection. Less than a decade later, Enron filed for 
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bankruptcy amidst rolling blackouts and increases in electricity prices. Western 
Interconnection stakeholders, who were already reluctant to give up authority for a 
geographically expansive RSO, were further disinclined after the apparent failure of 
California’s system (Penn “Top State”). The CAISO’s market regulations have developed 
greatly since the Enron Scandal, but some still worry that an RSO might foster a resurgence 
of conditions that encourage market manipulation. In response to the recent push for an 
expanded CAISO, Loretta Lynch, former president of the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC), said, “I am gravely concerned that California is careening down a 
path to throw away all of the protections that we fought so hard for in the aftermath of the 
energy crisis. Once they’re gone, there is no getting those protections back” (McDonald). 
Some have likened the creation of an RSO to “an Enron 2.0” due to the “potential reduction 
or loss of state oversight of the electric grid and the electric sales market” (Megerian and 
Penn). Certain parties fear that participants looking to exert market power could take 
advantage of preferential transmission rates for “no charge” EIM transactions or other 
proposed structural elements of the system (“Grid Forward”). Consumer Watchdog 
recently wrote to the California Senate that “the proposal is about going back to the [sic] 
arbitraging electricity on a free market so that no one can really keep track of the cost or 
the cleanliness of the energy being sold” and the creation of an RSO would “re-authoriz[e] 
the electricity de-regulation law that cost California ratepayers tens of billions of dollars” 
(“Watchdog Warns”). Largely motivated by the fear of repeating past mistakes, the Enron 
Scandal continues to deter some politicians from exploring an RSO.  
Fueled by the fear of repeating an Enron Scandal, many stakeholders accept the 
notion that seemingly any deregulation could launch the Western Interconnection back into 
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conditions ripe for market manipulation. Some opponents of an RSO espouse the idea that 
the new system would lead to large-scale arbitrage and market manipulation, as was the 
case in the California Electricity Crisis. Prolonged resistance to political action that could 
result in a negative outcome has created a status quo dependence on the current balkanized 
system. Many California politicians are thus now more comfortable with inaction than 
passing legislation that could potentially vilify them for creating arbitrage conditions, 
resulting in the political failure to pursue a system that would likely benefit all stakeholders. 
The California Electricity Crisis followed deregulation of the markets, yet many 
experts believe that it is potentially overly simplistic and misleading to equate this 
occurrence with causation. James Sweeney, Director of Stanford's Precourt Energy 
Efficiency Center claims that “California deregulation played only a minor role, if any at 
all, in creating the crisis” (Sweeney “The California Electricity” 279). At a time when too 
few plants were coming online to meet increasing population and economic growth, 
extremely low rainfall in Northern California and the Pacific Northwest resulted in a severe 
decrease in hydroelectric generation. Under these conditions, an already tight market gave 
way to electricity shortages. The financial crisis, according to Sweeney, was caused by 
“overly stringent regulation” that “precluded [utilities] from using long-term electricity 
purchase contracts to protect themselves financially from wholesale market price spikes” 
(Sweeney “The California Electricity 279). This lack of financial protection was 
compounded by the CPUC and governor’s unwillingness to allow necessary retail price 
increases and their refusal to let utilities hedge forward in longer-term transactions as 
wholesale spot markets exploded. This restriction created a disconnect between the 
quantity of energy demanded and the wholesale power price while keeping retail rates 
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artificially low and encouraging increased consumption, thereby increasing supply side 
price volatility and introducing a widening gap between wholesale and retail prices.  
Many electricity experts believe that deregulation of California’s energy market 
was not the driving force of the Electricity Crisis, and there are current mechanisms in 
place at the CAISO and the Ferc to prevent market power. RTOs were designed to “oversee 
competitive energy markets to guard against market power manipulation” (Caspary 2). 
Furthermore, CASIO's Department of Market Monitoring works to ensure that no 
participant is “able to take unfair advantage of the rules or procedures or concentrate market 
power and inhibit competition” (CAISO “We keep a close”). The CAISO’s Market 
Surveillance Committee is composed of independent industry experts that are similarly 
charged with providing feedback and recommendations about the market’s functions. 
Under an RSO, these programs would likely continue to provide potentially preventive 
monitoring. Additionally, the FERC’s ability to impose penalties for market manipulation 
was strengthened in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Hale 198). The FERC is authorized to 
impose fines of $1 million per violation, and can also require disgorgement of gains” (“Grid 
Forward”). Nonetheless, it is often extremely difficult to recognize market power until later 
audits.   
The successful existence of various RTOs around the world suggests that market 
failures do not necessarily follow deregulation. As a dominant energy policy leader in the 
US, California has often been forced to pave its own way without a model to follow. This 
is not the case with an RSO. Many states in the Eastern Interconnection and countries 
around the world have successfully restructured their electricity systems, including 
deregulation, and created RTO systems (Sweeney “The California Electricity” 278). The 
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seven American RTOs currently in existence “provide a template for development of an 
RSO in the Western U.S.” (“Grid Forward”). Studies have shown that RTOs often increase 
market transparency (Pfeinenberger). An examination of MISO, which also underwent 
deregulation, found that organized markets provide barriers to arbitrage, including 
regulation, “as high transaction costs imposed by the regulator restricted arbitrage” (Birge 
1). Proponents of an RSO believe that “the full pricing transparency and operating 
efficiencies of an integrated grid would help safeguard against another crisis in an 
affordable, sustainable way” (Sweeney “How the West” 117). The Western 
Interconnection could incorporate the successful regulations of current RTOs to create a 
comprehensive governing structure capable of resisting arbitrage and reducing 
inefficiencies.   
State Authority 
In addition to fearing the creation of a modern day, regional California Electricity Crisis, 
many states perceive lessened authority under an RSO as a threat to their independence. 
For many states in a region that places an especially high value on autonomy, the threat of 
reduced authority has not outweighed projected environmental and economic benefits. In 
2001, the FERC accepted RTO West’s proposal for an RTO that would control all 
transmission in the eight westernmost states, as well as the parts of California not included 
in the CAISO (Sweeney “The California Electricity” 247). After unsuccessful attempts to 
rally sufficient support, RTO West was later proposed as Grid West. Grid West faced 
substantial opposition, as many stakeholders doubted an RTO’s benefits at the time. In 
2004, the Snohomish County Public Utility District unsuccessfully filed a lawsuit to stop 
a vote to proceed with a set of bylaws for Grid West, which at the time was a non-profit 
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corporation with the goal of becoming an operational RTO (Risman). These goals were 
never realized, and after talks with key stakeholders, especially the Bonneville Power 
Administration, failed, the movement fizzled out in 2006 (Risman). After historical 
reluctance, many Western BAs are starting to recognize the merits of an RSO. As 
renewable generation increases across the country, some Western BAs are now more 
willing to recognize the value of an RSO as an effective mechanism to increase efficient 
renewable generation and dispatch. 
Some states, especially the Rocky Mountain states of Utah, Wyoming, and 
Montana, also worry that a California-dominated RSO governance structure would allow 
California’s aggressive climate policies to affect coal and natural gas dependent states’ 
ability to produce energy from nonrenewable sources. The CAISO’s governing board is 
currently composed of five governors appointed by the Governor of California and 
confirmed by the State Senate. This governance structure, which grants significant power 
to California politicians, is only grudgingly tolerated by the FERC. If an RSO was to move 
forward, political pressure from other participating states and the FERC’s regulation would 
require a transformation of the governing board structure. This new governing body must 
be capable of incorporating the authority and views of other the states, but the exact 
structure has been hotly contested. 
States that heavily rely on nonrenewable energy generation, especially those with 
large natural reserves of nonrenewable resources, have expressed concern about an RSO 
governance structure that could privilege California’s and other clean energy state’s policy 
goals. The Rocky Mountain states “differ substantially in their politics, economics, and 
cultures, and have not embraced [California’s] aggressive clean energy policies” (Florio 
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2). Wyoming alone provides about 40 percent of the U.S.’s coal and has, since 1986, been 
the nation’s leading coal producer (Trabish “Taming the Wild West”). These states fear 
that ceding or diluting their decision-making authority will compromise their status-quo 
dependence on ‘less expensive’ coal and natural gas.7 
States have traditionally retained and exerted some authority over the composition 
of energy resources built or procured to serve utility customers within their borders, 
especially by type fuel used to generate the electricity.  However, there are other 
dimensions of the resource portfolio that could be heavily influenced by collectively made 
decisions by an RSO.  For instance, an RSO could compromise California’s ability to make 
independent decisions about how to achieve and maintain resource adequacy (“Grid 
Forward”). Because RSOs are charged with ensuring grid reliability, the governing 
structure will act to “ensure that adequate amounts of resources and reserves are available 
on the system to meet load” (“Grid Forward”). State regulators are thus concerned by the 
probable weakening of their ability to authorize which resources their utilities procure and 
how best to achieve and maintain resource adequacy. Historically, a state’s native resources 
often constitute the majority of the resource portfolio used to serve load within the state. 
However, many Rock Mountain State stakeholders fear that progressive renewable policies 
will drive the RSO to shift resource adequacy away from these states’ historical generation 
of electricity. Wyoming Governor Matt Mead shares the concern and believes that RSO 
governance is “a complicated issue because there’s no scenario that [he’s] willing to have 
Wyoming submit to the California Legislature, and [he] think[s] Gov. Brown would say 
                                                
7 This typical characterization of coal and natural gas as “less expensive” often requires 
the improper exclusion of environmental externalities.  
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the same” (Siders). RSO participants would also be faced with shared costs from operating 
the system, constructing new transmission infrastructure, and ensuring resource adequacy. 
The socialization of costs is an especially substantial concern, especially for transmission 
investments that some states might regard as excessive regards.  
States who have historically enjoyed autonomy over their energy finances worry 
that they would have to submit to a cost allocation system of which they disapprove. 
Potential participants “want to ensure that they will be able to develop their own resource 
choices or achieve their own public policy goals and not be subject to a public policy 
requirement or cost imposed by a different state or new RSO authority” (“Grid Forward”). 
Thus, many Western states remain anxious about an RSO governing structure that greatly 
relinquishes their political autonomy.  
        In response to other Western states’ fears surrounding the RSO’s governance 
model, the CAISO has proposed a Western States Committee that would be made up of 
key stakeholders and each state’s energy leaders. Many non-Californian states believed the 
CAISO’s first and second straw proposals for “Principles for Governance of a Regional 
ISO” privileged Californian interests. Bryce Freeman, administrator of the Wyoming 
Office of Consumer Advocate, called the first proposal “the mother of all California-centric 
concerns” (Mullin “Governance Plans Fails”). After increased stakeholder feedback, the 
CAISO released their “Second Revised Proposal for Principles for Governance of a 
Regional ISO.” This version includes relatively high-level provisions for the creation of a 
Transitional Committee that would “develop the details of the governance structure, 
adhering to the principles set forth in legislation, and that committee’s proposal would need 
certain state and FERC approval before implementation could occur” (CAISO “ISO 
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Regional”). This committee would grant the flexibility necessary for various stakeholders 
to mold the governing structure. Furthermore, the revised proposal includes a provision for 
utilities’ right to voluntary withdrawal following a two-year written notice. Though there 
is no exit fee, the RSO retains the right to charge for decisions made before notice of 
withdrawal, such as allocation of costs for a regional transmission project approved before 
the submission of a written notice of withdrawal. Withdrawal may be an independent action 
taken by a utility, or it might occur “in light of an order by the state or local authority” 
(CAISO “Second Revised Proposal” 4). In this way, states still retain the ability to exert 
control over the behavior of their utilities. Freeman believes “that the revised proposal 
appears to be a step towards us rather than a step away” (“Grid Forward”). The proposal 
also “includes supermajority voting provisions intended to ensure a high degree of 
collaboration and consensus-building among the participants in this process” (CAISO 
“Revised Proposal” 9). At least 75 percent of voting members who collectively represent 
75 percent or more of the total load must approve proposals, thus working to prevent 
smaller members or members representing large loads from steamrolling legislation 
(CAISO “Summary of Stakeholder” 10). Though Western States’ fears of reduced 
autonomy are certainly reasonable, the CAISO is working with stakeholders to mitigate as 
many roadblocks as possible. 
Beyond mechanisms of an RSO governance structure, there are several other 
significant ways that states could exercise their authority. Section 205 filing rights allow 
transmission-owning utilities or transmission owners to request approval for the rates they 
wish to charge through a document filing process. The SPP and MISO have demonstrated 
the effectiveness of Section 205 filing rights as “means of ensuring that states’ perspectives 
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are provided due deference in the development of regional grid operator rules and 
procedures (Clements 4). States may also establish a regional state committee, as has been 
successfully executed by other RTOs like the SPP. A regional state committee can increase 
states’ status by allocating them “voting or advisory authority and direct interaction with 
the grid operator board and senior management” (Clements 2). When states do not have 
Section 205 filing rates, they may still intervene in FERC proceedings to express their 
stance on an RSO filling. Furthermore, states have the right to participate as stakeholders 
in RSO processes (Clements 5). The FERC “has made clear that states are priority 
stakeholders, and there is a shared belief that states’ views will hold weight once a filing 
makes it to the FERC” (Clements 5). In addition to a proper governing structure that 
represents their interests, states may utilize these valuable tools to participate in an RSO.  
Californian Resistance: State Autonomy 
While other states may fear California’s potential dominance of an RSO, California 
legislators are anxious about relinquishing its authority over electricity governance As the 
California Governor and Senate appoint the CAISO’s Board of Governors, they are able to 
exert political influence on the system. As the only ISO in the country “whose board 
members are appointed by the governor and chosen on the basis of sector representation 
and experience,” the CAISO is in a unique position to adopt California’s energy policies 
(“Grid Forward”). An RSO would likely decrease California’s autonomy, a prospect that 
concerns many in the state’s legislature but is necessary to entice other states to join. For 
example, to gain support from other states in the Western Interconnection, the CAISO’s 
“Revised Principles for Governance of a Regional ISO” does away with an initial Board of 
Governors under “which California-appointed members would have held a 5-4 majority” 
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(Mullin “Revised Western”). Though similar sacrifices may encourage non-California 
states to join the RSO, some Californians worry they are sacrificing too much. 
Many California opponents of an RSO worry that the State’s agenda - most 
importantly its clean energy goals- will be squashed by participants who do not share their 
progressive renewable energy policies, including two states who sued the Federal 
Government to dismantle the Clean Power Plan (CPP). In 2016, California Senate 
President pro tempore Kevin de Leon and Assembly speaker Anthony Redon wrote to 
Governor Jerry Brown that, “the proposed regionalization must not undermine state 
sovereignty or cede authority of our state’s cutting edge clean energy and climate policies 
to others who do not have the same strong commitment and legal framework to reduce 
climate pollution and promote clean energy” (Penn “Top State”). Mark Toney, executive 
director of The Utility Reform Network, which represents consumers in state regulatory 
proceedings, claims that the creation of an RSO “would permanently eliminate state 
authority over the governance of [CAISO] .... based on determinations made by an ad hoc 
commission, a result that is unacceptable as a matter of law, policy and progress” 
(Megerian and Penn). Without the support of the California Legislature, which, “due to its 
statutory history … holds the keys to moving forward,” little progress can truly be made 
toward the creation of an RSO. However, as long as California politicians remain fearful 
of losing their renewable policy progress, no significant steps can be taken.   
Though the state may not be able to control generation resources across the RSO, a 
2016 Sierra Club Docket to the California Energy Commission notes that, “California 
agencies would likely retain the authority in an expanded market to regulate the long-term 
investments of California-based utilities” as well as their procurement decisions (Ritchie 
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4).8 Furthermore, “Grid operators do not set state energy policy and have a long history of 
respecting it within other existing multi-state systems” (“Frequently Asked Questions”). 
An independent board with the proper framework in place, as “is the norm for the nation’s 
six other regional transmission operators,” would allow “all Western states [to] retain 
control over their respective energy policies” (Molgen). 
Without the enforcement of the CPP or other stringent environmental laws from the 
Federal Government, participants like the Rocky Mountain States, who no longer have to 
worry about compliance with the CPP, could see reduced economic benefits from joining 
an RSO. California opponents of an RSO believe that “federal regulations that are likely to 
be relaxed in coal-dependent states could remove incentives for those states to participate 
in a regional grid” (Siders). Before, the decision might have looked much simpler for coal-
dependent states. According to CAISO President Steve Berberich, when the CPP was still 
in place, these states “could face billions of dollars in costs to comply with the Clean Power 
Plan and other pollution regulations, or they could spend $20 million, join a regional 
market, and have access to zero marginal cost renewables” (Trabish “The Head”). Without 
compliance costs motivating behavior, the Rocky Mountain states have a greater ability to 
maintain their status-quo dependence on nonrenewable generation. 
While the economic benefits of participating in an RSO may have been reduced, 
there are still potentially significant savings from increased efficiencies. In the Western 
Interconnection, “even red states have renewable energy they want to market” (Siders). 
                                                
8 Some electricity experts believe that California’s movement toward Community Choice 
Aggregation (CCAs) may do more to undermine state regulators’ ability to control 
generation resource choices in the state compared to what any RSO might be able to 
influence. 
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Laura Nelson, energy adviser to the Utah Public Service Commission, notes that parts of 
the Rocky Mountain West “really do have a different view of our resources,” but that “Utah 
has been engaged in those conversations” regarding RSO participation (Fordney). The state 
has historically been dependent on coal generation but now is being to increase exploitation 
of its “natural gas and is on track to increase its renewable penetration to 8%” (Fordney). 
Utah could benefit from a system that both rewards exports of renewable generation to 
progressive states like California and increases the efficiency of renewable dispatch within 
Utah’s own borders.  
Many states in the Western Interconnection find themselves in a similar situation 
to Utah, especially due to the expected increasing renewable penetration across the Western 
Interconnection. The U.S. Energy Information Administration forecasts that “renewable 
energy will be the fastest-growing power source through 2040” (Hulac). Furthermore, 
many utility and transmission developers in the West are working on projects and 
initiatives that would be profitable under the current system, but would be even more 
beneficial under an RSO. Some companies are depending on regionalization to make their 
projects cost-effective. The electric transmission developer TransCanyon acknowledges 
that some of their lines under construction are not cost-effective under current market 
conditions, and they may not be “until a regional system makes the benefits throughout the 
entire region greater than the development costs” (Trabish “Transmission Developers”).9 
Pressure from stakeholders like TransCanyon or participants investing in renewable energy 
could further encourage states to move ahead with an RSO. Nonetheless, industry support 
                                                
9 TransCanyon has noted that their projects could also become economic if new 
renewable energy contracts were created between western off-takers and more 
midwestern generators.  
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and the increasing penetration of renewables may not be enough to push California 
politicians to overcome their fears.  
Californian Resistance: FERC Fears 
In addition to potentially reducing incentives for the Rocky Mountain States to comply 
with California’s progressive legislation, many California politicians and citizens fear that 
President Trump could use political appointees to the FERC to challenge the state’s energy 
goals through increased oversight and regulation. Some fear that opening the state’s 
“electricity market to other states could invite federal intervention in the state's energy 
policy, including through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission” (Siders). Michael 
Picker, CPUC President, recently stated that the CPUC has “a long-standing fear of FERC” 
(Fordney). Jamie Court, president of Consumer Watchdog, believes that an RSO "puts 
California's tough laws on the chopping block for Donald Trump's ax” and further 
questions why “California legislature resisting Trump's evisceration of our environmental 
and consumer rights risk giving Trump appointees new power to invalidate California laws 
and agreements?” (Court). The anxiety over allowing greater FERC participation in 
Californian legislative goals prevents legislators from truly considering an RSO as a viable 
option.  
It is highly unlikely that California would come under any greater FERC 
jurisdiction than it currently experiences. The CAISO maintains that California would not 
cede its energy authority to the FERC as it is currently already under FERC jurisdiction. 
Thus, this jurisdiction “would not change with a regional energy market” (CAISO 
“Regional ISO”). According to a report by Yale’s Environmental Protection Clinic, the 
FERC has always had the authority to regulate it as a public utility under the Federal Power 
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Act because “it operates transmission facilities, ... its markets set the rates for wholesale 
electricity sales, and … its market rules ‘affect or pertain to’ rates for wholesale electricity 
sales” (Brint 9). Thus, the FERC has been regulating the CAISO since its creation and will 
continue to do so, whether California adopts an RSO or maintains its current system. 
Furthermore, the FERC is authorized to regulate all investor-owned public utilities that 
own transmission facilities, meaning that participants who do not operate within an 
organized wholesale electricity market still fall under the FERC’s jurisdiction, and would 
likewise continue to be regulated by it under an RSO (Brint 10). Additionally, the FPA 
requires the FERC “to be apolitical and prevents it from interfering in state decisions” 
(Trabish “Transmission Developers”). However, if state policy directly frustrates federal 
policy, federal sovereignty will prevail whenever the intent to preempt state authority is a 
reasonable inference for a court to draw from the facts and the law. Though the President 
may make partisan appointments, according to Zichella, the FERC “has not historically 
been a ‘place for policy meddling’” (Siders). Even with Trump’s appointees to the FERC, 
Monique Watson, formerly deputy director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation’s 
Division of Pipeline Regulation, does not “anticipate the commission will take a political 
bent” (Grandoni). For California legislators worried about FERC intervention, Zichella has 
stated that a regional market could “help protect California from being singled out” 
(Siders). Thus, participation in an RSO would likely not allow for greater FERC 
interference in California’s policies, and could potentially add a layer of protection between 
the state and the Federal Government.  
Some politicians wary of the Trump Administration worry that the FERC could 
specifically use the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause to threaten California’s 
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aggressive clean energy agenda under an RSO. Opponents worry “that state policies might 
be challenged as … conflicting with (and thus being preempted by) the Federal Power Act” 
(“Environmental Protection”). The Trump Administration could theoretically utilize the 
Supremacy Clause to preempt California’s laws by claiming that they conflict with a 
federal law like the Federal Power Act. Critics also argue that because interstate commerce 
“falls squarely under federal control,” an RSO “could expose the state’s climate and energy 
policies to a new line of attack from a hostile administration (Baker).The Commerce Clause 
gives the Federal Government the authority to regulate interstate commerce, including 
limiting state behavior that attempts to control actions that occur beyond a state’s borders, 
discriminates against out-of-state commerce, or creates unwarranted obstacles for interstate 
commerce (Brint 8). The FERC could potentially impose sanctions if they found that the 
CAISO’s behavior was objectionable by the Commerce Clause.  
However, California’s environmental laws already affect wholesale electricity 
transactions and thus affect interstate commerce, meaning that the FERC could already 
utilize and could continue to utilize the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause whether 
or not the CAISO is expanded into an RSO (Brint 16-17). Yale’s Environmental Protection 
Clinic report examined California’s RPS, cap-and-trade program, and GHG emissions 
performance standard for long-term contracts with base load power and “concluded that 
the creation of a regional system operator would not make challenges under the dormant 
Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause more likely to succeed” (“Environmental 
Protection”). Even if California's RPS was challenged, for example, the state could contend 
that their legislation does not unnecessarily burden interstate commerce in wholesale 
electricity but rather creates a new market (Brint 27). Legal precedent for this argument 
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was set in Allco v Klee, in which a federal district court upheld Connecticut’s RPS, “which 
limits eligible resources to those in the ISO-New England region or an agency region,” on 
the basis that it efficiently created a new market for renewable energy and does not impose 
a burden on pre-existing interstate commerce (Brint 26). It is unlikely that the FERC would 
be able to challenge California’s existing renewable energy legislation under an RSO in 
any manner that is substantially legally different than the methods that are currently 
available to the regulatory body. 
Californian Resistance: The Sierra Club and PacifiCorp 
        Some Californian RSO opponents, including environmental organizations, citizens, 
and legislators, are primarily concerned over the state’s ability to implement aggressive 
renewable policy under a Trump appointed FERC, yet two of the country’s most prominent 
environmental organizations - the NRDC and the Sierra Club - disagree over the impacts 
of an RSO. The Sierra Club understands that there are potentially large long-term 
environmental and economic benefits; however, the organization fears an immediate rise 
in GHG emissions and the potential for increased FERC scrutiny of California’s 
progressive legislation under an RSO. The NRDC believes the RSO is one of the most 
cost-effective means of meeting California’s GHG and RPS legislative goals. The NRDC 
also chooses to focus on projected substantial long-term environmental benefits and 
recognizes that “myriad studies” have shown that “the key to deep penetration of renewable 
power into the grid … is operating the system over a large geographic footprint” (Zichella 
“Regional Transmission” 6-7). For the organization, the projected benefits clearly 
outweigh the potential costs.  
Hacker 
 
37 
        The Sierra Club’s concerns over California’s ability to sustain its environmental 
progress under an RSO have led the group to become one of the most vocal and prolific 
opponents of the proposal. The organization now recognizes that California will be under 
FERC regulation regardless of RSO participation. However, Sierra Club California 
Director Kathyrn Phillips worries that, even if the FERC under Trump chooses not to 
challenge policies formulated under the CAISO, the regulatory body “may be more 
inclined to get involved” if California “were to join a regional grid with other states that 
have vastly different approaches to energy issues - such as Utah or Montana” (Baker). 
Phillips draws attention to the uncertainty of an RSO, especially give the Trump 
Administration’s weakened environmental regulations.  
While the Sierra Club is fearful of California losing their autonomy, all states will 
retain a good deal of authority, especially concerning their environmental policies. 
Ultimately, a proper governance structure, potentially modeled off of the eight successful 
Eastern Interconnection RTOs, would “still allow every participating state - including 
California - to control its own electricity policies while cooperating with neighboring states 
and provinces and lowering utility bills within them” (Sweeney “How the West” 117). 
However, there is no certainty that other states in an RSO would not challenge California’s 
policies by involving the FERC to the extent there is some avenue for doing so. Phillips 
believes that states could “ru[n] to the FERC and sa[y], ‘You’ve got to get involved, 
because California’s being too green’” (Baker). Though there is no guarantee that 
California’s legislation will not face scrutiny from other states, RSO proponents hope that 
a proper Governing Board can create a structure that encourages compromise and 
recognizes state autonomy. Furthermore, the NRDC’s Zichella believes that Phillips is 
Hacker 
 
38 
“throwing up a red herring here, playing on concern about the Trump administration 
politicizing FERC. Moreover, any RTO construct will have a prominent role for states … 
some more than others” (Zichella “Re: Response”). As California has about 33 percent of 
the Western Interconnection entire load, the state will likely have a large voice in RSO 
proceedings (Zichella “Re: Response”). Furthermore, FERC regulation is largely based on 
Federal Power Act authority to regulate electricity sellers—not buyers. As the majority of 
environmental state electricity policies, such as an RPS, regulate purchasers of power by 
placing obligations on them directly. The CAISO has a very small role in enforcing or 
influencing California’s environmental legislation, and it would be unlikely that the FERC 
attempt to interfere with the state’s regulations on purchasers of power.  
The Sierra Club is also concerned over the potential for an RSO to result in greater 
GHG emissions for a short period of time. In 2015, the CAISO and the PacifiCorp states 
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to explore PacifiCorp’s full participation in 
the CAISO’s markets (Johnson 16). Other states have expressed interest in an RSO, but 
PacifiCorp is currently the CAISO’s sole partner, and, in the eyes of many 
environmentalists, a very problematic one. It is the largest owner of coal-fired plants in the 
Western Interconnection and more than 60 percent of the company’s electricity is 
generated from coal (Trabish “The Head”). According to the SB 350 Study, if PacifiCorp 
remained the only other participant, the Western Interconnection could see “a very small 
increase in GHG emissions” of about 0.4 percent “due to a slight increase in coal-fired 
generation outside of California” (CAISO “Senate Bill 350” 27). However, this increase is 
not projected to persist past the year 2020.  
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While PacifiCorp has indicated that they will likely be moving away from coal 
generation in the future, environmentalists, like the Sierra Club, object to the inclusion of 
the PacifiCorp states under the CAISO out of the fear that this participation may increase 
total GHG emissions across the Western Interconnection. Though California is a renewable 
energy leader at present, “the proposal to develop a regional energy market with PacifiCorp 
could” not only relinquish “control over state clean energy policies” but also “undermine 
[the state’s] leadership on climate change by giving new life to coal plants in the west” 
(Penn “Top State”). Sierra Club Staff Attorney Travis Ritchie worries that an RSO could 
increase “the dispatch of specific coal units across the PacifiCorp service territory,” which 
could “in turn prolong the life of some of the dirtiest plants in the West” (Trabish “The 
Head”). The Sierra Club believes this would be a result of the increased efficiency and 
dispatch of coal units in a regional market, which would improve the economics of these 
plants and provide market signals for PacifiCorp to invest more heavily in non-renewable 
generation (Ritchie 3). The Sierra Club also argues that an RSO could result in the 
increased dispatch of out-of-state non-renewable generation to meet California loads, or an 
increase in out-of-state non-renewable generation to meet other states’ loads that were 
previously met with generation from cleaner resources (Ritchie 3).   
PacifiCorp’s lone participation does have the potential to increase GHG emissions 
by 0.2 percent across the entire Western Interconnection by 2020 according to the SB 350 
Study; however, projections show that GHG emissions would decrease significantly after 
this period (CAISO “Senate Bill 350” 40). PacifiCorp seems committed to reducing their 
environmental impact, especially because the structure of an RSO makes renewable energy 
generation more cost-effective than the current balkanized system, further incentivizing 
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renewable energy development by potential participants. Bob Gravely, a PacifiCorp 
spokesman, states that PacifiCorp’s “trajectory continues to be toward more renewables” 
and that “a regional market helps facilitate that transition” (Megerian and Penn). An RSO’s 
broad geographic footprint would also “expose coal-fired generation in PacifiCorp (and in 
the rest of the regional footprint) to more competition from regional renewable generation 
… and efficient natural gas-fired generation” (CAISO “Senate Bill 350” 40). As other 
energy experts have noted, “The transition to a regional grid in the West could change the 
geopolitics of U.S. energy … Wyoming is a coal state but it could become the Saudi Arabia 
of wind. There are tectonic forces at work in these markets and California demand could 
be a decisive factor” (Trabish “Taming the Wild”). In fact, the benefits of an RSO are so 
imperative to renewable integration for PacifiCorp that their Midwest Utility 
(MidAmerican Energy), which is moving to 80 percent renewables, “could not do that 
without a regional ISO” (Mullin “Governance Plan Critics”). Though unlikely, if 
“regionalization did increase emissions from PacifiCorp’s coal plants, the company would 
work to mitigate them” (Mullin “Governance Plan Critics”). Additionally, though much 
more limited in scope and not a direct comparison, the EIM has seen quicker participation 
than opponents initially thought. PacifiCorp is currently the only company to announce an 
MOU with the CAISO but most experts believe that “as [other BAs] start to see the 
advantages in dealing with challenges they have, there will be an evolution to joining” 
(Trabish “Taming the Wild”). Under a scenario with multiple BAs participating, the 
projected GHG reductions leave no doubt about an RSO’s environmental benefit.  
Legislative Challenges 
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Though the roadblocks and potential drawbacks to an RSO may seem great to opponents, 
many proponents believe that they are surmountable. One of the opponents’ largest fears - 
a Trump-appointed FERC meddling in California’s progressive energy legislation - is not 
more likely to occur than if the state stayed out of an RSO. The Sierra Club’s Phillips 
believes that it “would be a big mistake right now” to do “anything to further entangle 
ourselves with states that support [Trump’s] policies or agencies that he controls” (Baker). 
Trump’s presidency will not last for more than a total of eight years, but an RSO in the 
Western Interconnection created today could last for decades to come. Proponents might 
think it a big mistake to hold out on creating a system with as large a geographic footprint 
as possible just to avoid the hypothetical possibility of only vaguely founded federal 
entanglement. Furthermore, there is a large delay between when an RTO is proposed, 
developed, and operational. Existing RTOs have demonstrated “that it takes several years 
to set up a regional market” (CAISO “Senate Bill 350” 17). President Trump may therefore 
be out of office before an RSO is operating in the Western Interconnection. 
Many politicians’ fear of repeating the mistakes that led to the California Electricity 
Crisis make them unwilling to develop an RSO, even though similar structures have been 
successful within the nation and around the world. For some wary legislators, inaction is a 
safer option than creating an organized market with the unlikely potential for severe 
consequences. The vaguely defined anxiety of organizations like the Consumer Watchdog 
group gives politicians further pause. In the rare case that a better-organized regional 
market should create conditions ripe for exertion of market power, politicians face great 
potential backlash from organizations who warn against an RSO.  
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The fears of various stakeholders have created a political roadblock that has slowed 
down progress toward the creation of an RSO. Before allowing legislation to move 
forward, some groups exhibiting highly risk-averse behavior, like the Sierra Club, want a 
governing structure that prioritizes California's climate policies and leaves no room for 
increased coal generation. Additionally, the Sierra Club has adopted a strict stance that 
rejects the creation of an RSO on the grounds that it could potentially include more coal, 
no matter that projected GHG emissions would significantly decline. Bill Corcoran, a 
Western director of the Sierra Club, stated that “the problem at the center of the issue is a 
very dirty utility that would be linked with the California grid” (Penn “Brown Wants”). 
The organization’s hardline position seemingly precludes the projected benefits from 
outweighing the potential costs of an RSO.  
The Sierra Club, some California politicians, and other opposed stakeholders’ 
unwillingness to compromise is understandably worrisome to the Rocky Mountain States, 
who would already be adopting a market first engineered by Californians. These states 
must wait for “several key decisions, including governance, to be made by the current 
CAISO Board and the California Legislature before new participants can join the ISO” 
(“Principles and Issues” 1). Although the CAISO is consulting non-Californian 
stakeholders in creating governance proposals, the CAISO and California legislators are 
given the authority and responsibility of making some of the first imperative decisions. 
Disagreement within California is stalling action on these necessary, initial decisions. 
Furthermore, the last legislative session saw that “attempts to broker compromises between 
competing interests have repeatedly fallen short, and divisions have grown increasingly 
bitter” (Megerian). Throughout the Western Interconnection, “energy federalism continues 
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to shape decentralized decision-making and coordination has often been fractious” 
(Lenhart et al. 94). However, Californian opposition is serving to exacerbate the rest of the 
Western Interconnection’s propensity towards isolation and self-reliance. A pattern is 
emerging in which unwillingness to compromise compounds stakeholders’ existing fear, 
creating a political failure in which both sides are reluctant to move forward without strong 
concessions from the other side.  
There is another cause for concern to this sustained period of inaction: if 
development of an RSO waits much longer, the CAISO may not be able to tap all 38 BAs 
that currently operate outside of an RTO. The NRDC’s Cavanagh predicted that if the 
venture for an RSO did not pick up steam, other organized markets would “take advantage 
of the missed opportunity” (Hering). Just a few days after California legislators failed to 
authorize the next steps to an RSO in 2017, the Mountain Transmission Group (MWTG) 
confirmed that they entered final negotiations to join SPP. Although “MWTG’s first choice 
was CAISO’s proposed regional market,” when “political pushback delayed it, they turned 
to SPP” (Trabish “Transmission Developers”). This loss is a huge “missed opportunity” 
for the proposed RSO which could lead to “domino effects” among other BAs who want 
to join a regional system, according to the NRDC’s Director of Western Renewable Grid 
Planning, Julia Prochnik (Trabish “Transmission Developers”). If California legislators 
want the best possible outcome for their RSO, they must move quickly before any more 
Western BAs join another organized market. Californians must decide if they prefer for 
other organized markets, like SPP, and their leaders to dominate the grid, or if they want 
the CAISO to become a leader in the west (Hering).  
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Though time is limited, politicians who rush to get legislation approved may not be 
met with support, as was the case with Representative Holden’s Assembly Bills 726 and 
831. Holden hurriedly introduced his legislation providing the framework for California to 
take the next steps towards an RSO at the end of the state’s most recent legislative session. 
However, his actions drew suspicion, especially because opponents have linked the RSO 
movement with big companies looking to ram through legislation before Californians 
understand the true consequences. Consumer Watchdog’s Court believes that if the 
proposal were actually “good for California it wouldn't materialize in the last week of the 
session when no one has time to focus on the details and problems before voting. This is a 
last-minute ramrod that will come back to haunt you” (“Watchdog Warns”). Many 
opponents believe that such a complex bill with the potential to transform the Western 
Interconnection should only be passed when policymakers have hammered out all of the 
details of an RSO. However, given the complexity of an RSO, it is highly unlikely that 
opponents will ever have sufficient information or regulations regarding the new system’s 
structure before it is actually created.   
Though opponents crave certainty, many electricity experts recognize that 
uncertainty and modifications are simply part of the process. As Sweeney states,  
Any major restructuring of such important systems will continue to 
require modifications well after the initial changes have been 
implemented. System operation requires monitoring and may require 
wise and strong leadership to identify and implement changes that are 
needed after unintended adverse consequences of the system change 
become apparent (Sweeney “The California Electricity” 281). 
 
Jennifer Gardner, staff attorney for Western Resource Advocates, believes that “any 
proposal taken to the legislature ‘should be as broad as possible to not tie the hands of the 
transitional committee’” (Mullin “Governance Plan Critics”). Robin Smutny-Jones, 
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director of California policy and regulations for Avangrid, has recognized that an RSO 
“would need to work through contentious issues such as transmission access charges and 
regional resource adequacy, both of which would be left to a newly constituted RTO” 
(Mullin “Governance Plan Critics”). However, she notes that “other states have done it, 
and the West can too” (Mullin “Governance Plan Critics”). While leaving details of the 
RSO’s functioning to future deliberation is risky in the eyes of the Sierra Club and other 
opponents fearful of the system’s potential consequences, it is likely the only way for 
development to progress.  
If stakeholders remain unwilling to compromise on their demands, there is little 
hope for an RSO to move forward. The CAISO has been responsive to stakeholder input 
in their “Revised Principles for Governance of a Regional ISO,” but they cannot 
simultaneously satisfy Californian opponents and the other Western States’ desire for 
autonomy. The CAISO is thus forced to walk a fine line as it “must maintain the 
involvement and confidence of California utilities, transmission owners and policy 
makers” while “it interacts with and balances power and influence among new stakeholders 
as it seeks regionalization” (Lenhart et al. 105). Politicians must also carefully navigate the 
waters of an RSO by attempting to protect ratepayers, advancing their state’s economic 
goals and environmental agenda, and avoiding “burdens from transmission cost allocation, 
loss of rate stability, loss of local political and operational control, and exposure to 
fundamentally different energy system values and policy drivers” (Lenhart et al. 105). This 
balancing act, as well as continued risk-aversion resulting from the Enron Scandal, has 
historically prevented effective political action to advance an RSO. However, many 
California politicians and energy experts have begun to realize that an RSO “could be 
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critical in California’s bid to derive half the state’s electricity from renewable sources by 
2030” and is probably the most cost-effective option (Yoder). California is likely the state 
that stands to benefit the most from an RSO due to the requirements of their progressive 
energy policies. Furthermore, the state will also need to be the first to compromise as “the 
rest of the West is not willing to engage more fully until [California] change[s] 
governance” (Hering). Until the California Legislature takes initiative, it is doubtful that 
progress towards an RSO can truly occur.  
Conclusion  
Although there are significant, legitimate questions arising from the development 
of a Western RSO, these issues have been successfully worked through in the formation of 
RTOs around the world. The barriers to an RSO in the Western Interconnection do not 
seem to be technical. Rather, political barriers constitute the greatest roadblock to creating 
a system that would garner large projected benefits. Risk-averse politicians apparently find 
inaction to be a safer option than exposing themselves to the unlikely possibility that an 
RSO could bring major negative consequences reminiscent of the California Electricity 
Crisis. Furthermore, stakeholders are extremely reluctant to compromise and find common 
ground, even when presented with evidence from legal analysis, comprehensive technical 
studies, and examples of existing RTOs that show substantial economic and environmental 
benefits. As clean energy expert Allison Clements simply states, “There’s a lot of fear 
about this change. Change is scary,” but “the fear is overstated” (Megerian and Penn). This 
overstated fear continues to drive politicians away from developing a system that could 
positively shape the future of Western Interconnection electricity markets. 
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The process of creating a regional market is not only complicated but also lengthy 
as participants must seek the necessary regulatory approvals—first among the individual 
state venues and then at the FERC—and then undertake complex logistical preparations 
prior to final market launch. It will likely take several years “to achieve a regional market 
of sufficient size to provide the available regional market benefits” (CAISO “Senate Bill 
350” xiv). California’s clean energy goals are immediate and pressing. In just over a 
decade, the state must source 50 percent of its generation from renewable resources while 
maintaining economic growth. The state is well-endowed with renewable resources, but 
must act effectively to ensure that the incorporation of this generation does not create a 
steeper and costlier Duck Curve or lead to increased curtailment of renewable generation. 
Although there are other complementary means for facilitating California’s aggressive 
renewable energy goals and mitigating the Duck Curve—such as demand response 
programs and large-scale storage—the formation of an RSO is likely the cheapest method 
and could annually provide “$1 billion to $1.5 billion in savings to California electricity 
users” in addition to savings by other participating states (Trabish “The Head”). As 
Michele Beck, director of the Utah Office of Consumer Services, says: “Ultimately, 
policymakers will have to weigh whether a certain amount of loss of sovereignty is worth 
the benefit” (Mullin “Revised Western”). Opposing stakeholders will need to accept the 
risk of unforeseen consequences and compromise on their parochial “wish lists” for an 
RSO. As the NRDC states, “Given the demonstration of potential benefits stemming from 
regionalizing the current grid operator, it is well worth trying to find a workable option” 
(Clements). With little time to spare, especially as California nears its policy goal end-dates 
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and as the effects of climate change worsen, it is crucial for stakeholders to quickly move 
forward with development to realize the maximum benefits of an RSO. 
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